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Abstract—The transmission network plays a key role in an
oligopolistic electricity market. In fact, the capacity of a trans-
mission network determines the degree to which the generators
in different locations compete with others and could also greatly
influence the strategic behaviors of market participants. In such
an oligopolistic framework, different agents may have distinct
and sometimes opposite interests in urging or hindering certain
transmission expansions. Therefore, the regulatory authority,
starting from the existing grid, faces the challenge of defining an
optimal network upgrade to be used as benchmark for approval
or rejection of a given transmission expansion.
The aim of this paper is to define the concept of reference trans-
mission network (RTN) from an economic point of view and to pro-
vide a tool for the RTN assessment in a deregulated framework
where strategic behaviors are likely to appear. A general game-
theoretic model for the RTN evaluation is presented, and the so-
lution procedure is discussed. The strategic behavior of market
agents in the spot market is modeled according to a Supply Func-
tion Equilibrium approach. The impact of transmission capacity
expansion on market participants’ strategic behavior is studied
on a three-bus test network. The RTN is computed and compared
with the optimal expansion found when perfect competition among
power producers is assumed.
Index Terms—Game theory, optimal network, strategic bidding,
transmission planning.
NOMENCLATURE
The main mathematical symbols used throughout this paper
are listed (in alphabetical order) in the following. Note that if
a single generic element is defined using two indexes (for ex-
ample, ), the notation is used to refer to the vector whose
elements are , for , and the notation is used to
refer to the vector composed by the vectors , for .
Analogously, when a generic element is defined using a single
index , the notation refers to the vector whose elements are
, for .
Intercept of the supply function.
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Slope of the supply (marginal cost)
function.
Susceptance matrix.
Strategic bid coefficient of .
Strategic bid coefficients of all the power pro-
ducers except .
Intercept of the demand function.
Discount factor.
Marginal value of power withdrawn by .
Total number of ’s in (i.e., ).
Transmission capacity of the line between
buses and .
Generator index.
Set of generators at bus .
Generator at bus .
Investment cost of .
Load index.
Locational marginal price at bus .
Set of loads at bus .
Load at bus .
, Bus indexes.
, Marginal values of transmission capacity of the
line between buses and .
Set of power system buses.
Payoff of .
Planner payoff.
Power produced by .
Capacity limit for power plant.
Vector whose generic element is .
Corresponds to the total power injected at bus
, and it coincides with the sum of elements of
vector (if the vector exists, otherwise
to 0).
Power withdrawn by .
Maximum power withdrawal by .
Vector whose generic element is .
Corresponds to the total power withdrawal at
bus and coincides with the sum of elements of
vector (if the vector exists, otherwise
to 0).
Slope of the demand function.
Period index.
Voltage angle at bus .
Spot market session index.
Total number of time periods.
Set of Transmission Expansion candidate
plans.
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th transmission expansion candidate plan.
Refers to the generic during period .
Refers to the generic at session during pe-
riod .
Dimension of the generic set .
Acronyms
CS Consumer surplus.






RTN Reference transmission network.
SFE Supply function equilibrium.
SG Stage game.
SPNE Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
SW Social welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE structure of the electricity industry has dramaticallychanged in the last two decades. As a matter of fact, the
power sector has been privatized and restructured in many coun-
tries around the world. The main reason for such a change lies
in the expectation that competition could lead to a reduction
in electricity prices and could stimulate the emergence of new
technologies. However, in quite a few cases, strategic behav-
iors have emerged, and prices considerably higher than marginal
costs have been observed [1].
In this new deregulated environment, the transmission net-
work plays a key role when the analysis of power market and
of market power issues are addressed. In fact, the capacity of
transmission lines determines the degree to which generators in
different locations could compete [2].
The existing transmission network has been designed,
planned, and built in a vertically integrated environment, fol-
lowing the traditional planning criteria. Since the system was
operated by a unique entity, the transmission planning was
required to achieve a certain level of efficiency in a framework
where only centralized and coordinated decisions were made.
In [3], an extensive classification of transmission expansion
planning models and of different synthesis algorithms for trans-
mission planning is presented. The synthesis planning models
can be classified as mathematical optimization or heuristic
methods. The former type includes linear programming, dy-
namic programming, nonlinear programming, mixed integer
programming, and optimization techniques such as Bender
decomposition and hierarchical decomposition [4]–[6]. The
latter one includes simulated annealing, tabu search, expert
systems, fuzzy set theory, and greedy randomized adaptive
search procedures [7]–[10].
In the context of competitive electricity markets, several new
transmission planning issues have emerged [11], [12]. They
originate from new uncertainties related, for example, to the
impact of market transactions on physical flows, to decisions
of new generation investments and old power plant stripping
made independently by market participants, and also from the
increasing requirements of flexibility and robustness of the
network needed in the competitive environment.
There is an ongoing debate concerning the best approach for
the management of transmission investments (monopolistic or
market-driven approach) and the most suitable way to recover
them, e.g., congestion and variable charges, fixed costs’ alloca-
tion [13]–[17].
Furthermore, various ways to attract investments are de-
scribed in the literature [18]. In particular, the merchant
approach, relying on auctions of long-term Financial Transmis-
sion Rights (FTRs), and the related critiques can be found in
[19] and [20]. An alternative approach, built upon a regulatory
mechanism for Transco and based on a price cap formula, is
developed in [21], whereas in [22], an approach that defines op-
timal transmission capacity, according to the strategic behavior
of generators in a discriminatory auction market structure, is
proposed. Interesting models of decentralized coalition forma-
tion for transmission expansion purposes, based on concepts
from cooperative game theory and distributed artificial intelli-
gence, are studied in [23] and [24].
Nevertheless, without restricting ourselves to a particular
transmission investor or a specific method for recovering the
transmission investment costs, we believe that an independent
authority should at least monitor and approve the proposed
expansion plans.
Indeed, the independent authority, starting from the existing
grid, faces the challenge of defining a benchmark network to
which any expansion proposal should be compared. The bench-
mark network should foster competition and reduce, when pos-
sible, the exercise of market power by market agents.
To address this challenge, the authority needs to be able to
quantify the benefits accruing from network capacity expansion.
This can be realized through the modeling of strategic spatial
interactions among agents in the market [25].
The analysis of agents’ strategic interactions in electricity
networks and the market results forecasts, both for single and for
multiperiod electricity market sessions, have been extensively
studied in the last years. For example, models based on game
theory concepts such as Bertrand, Cournot, Supply Function
Equilibrium, and Conjectural Variation as well as models based
on price-quota concept have emerged ([26]–[36] are among the
most recent examples, whereas [26] and [28], besides proposing
new approaches, provide a review of the previous most signifi-
cant oligopolistic electricity market models). New market struc-
tures where energy and transmission service are traded have also
been proposed [37], [38].
The focus of this paper is on the interrelationship between
investment in transmission capacity and strategic behavior of
market participants.
First, the concept of Reference Transmission Network is in-
troduced, from an economic point of view. Then, a tool for the
estimation of the RTN is developed using a game theory ap-
proach. The RTN assessment is based on the analysis of a dy-
namic noncooperative game.
The first level of the game corresponds to the choice of op-
timal network topology, whereas the remaining part of the game
represents an oligopolistic framework in which power producers
interact for a certain time horizon. In particular, it includes the
MINOIA et al.: REFERENCE TRANSMISSION NETWORK: A GAME THEORY APPROACH 251
modeling of the bilevel problem faced by each power producer
that needs to make a strategic bid aimed to maximize its own
payoff. In fact, when making the strategic choice, the producer
should take into account that: 1) all the other generators are si-
multaneously making analogous choices and that 2) an ISO will
clear the market on the basis of the bids he received.
The strategic behavior of power producers is modeled using
an SFE approach. In particular, the single-period approach pro-
posed in [39] is extended in order to address a multisession
framework in which there exists an obligation for firms to bid
consistently over a certain time horizon.
The RTN estimation is derived from the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II elab-
orates on the principles upon which a RTN should be defined.
The proposed RTN simulation tool is illustrated in Section III.
More precisely, Section III-A describes the spot market clearing
mechanism, Section III-B elaborates on the model used for
power producers’ strategic behavior simulation, together with
the algorithm used for the NE calculation, and Section III-C
shows the procedure used for evaluating the SPNE of the
game and determining the RTN. Test results are presented and
discussed in Section IV, and finally, Section V concludes.
II. REFERENCE TRANSMISSION NETWORK
In a deregulated market, it is of fundamental importance, both
for regulation purposes and for a utility’s decision-making pur-
poses, to be able to rely on quantitative measures of system per-
formances, as well as to know how those system performances
are affected by changes of decision-makers’ operation strate-
gies, and by system reinforcements and expansions.
The necessity of defining performance benchmarks for the ex-
isting transmission network is addressed in [40]. Furthermore, in
[41], the concept of performance indexes for a distribution net-
work is linked with the concept of reference distribution network.
These two studies focus on system performances concerned
with reliability issues. Moreover, both methodologies are devel-
oped taking the utility point of view. In particular, in [40], reli-
ability performance indexes are aimed to provide the transmis-
sion utility with measures of the quality of service to be given
to the customers, as well as to provide measures to be used by
the utility when evaluating different planning and design proce-
dures; whereas, in [41], the distribution network operator could
benefit from the definition of the reference distribution network
to justify future plans and charges, since this reference distribu-
tion network specifies the best tradeoff between costs and ben-
efits delivered in terms of performance indexes.
In this paper, the definition of reference distribution network
of [41] is modified and extended to the transmission network.
In particular, the proposed definition relies on economic per-
formances evaluated by taking the point of view of a central-
ized “planner,” where the word “planner” is taken in its broadest
sense. We assume that the “planner” is the entity designated to
judge and, when appropriate, to approve transmission expansion
plans proposed by investors.
The decision of the “planner” of approving or rejecting a spe-
cific transmission expansion proposal should be founded on a
fair comparison between the same proposal and a benchmark
defined in a transparent and objective manner. The aim of the
RTN is to represent such a benchmark.
The RTN, from an economic point of view, is a network
obtained by an optimal upgrade of the existing transmission
network. In particular, the RTN is characterized by an optimal
network topology aimed to achieve the best tradeoff between
transmission expansion costs and benefits deriving from the
expansion, where the benefits are calculated over the whole time
horizon in which the expansion plan is supposed to be in place.
An appropriate Performance Function, used by the “planner”
for measuring the tradeoff between expansion costs and of ac-
tual economic advantages of market participants, is introduced.
While the value of transmission expansion costs is supposed
to be estimated by the “planner,” the estimation of actual eco-
nomic benefits of market participants is supposed to be calcu-
lated using a simulation tool that mimics the strategic behaviors
of market participants. The transmission expansion that maxi-
mizes the PF value corresponds to the RTN.
The PF to be chosen for the RTN definition should certainly
be fair and objective. However, depending on the policy objec-
tives of the “planner,” or depending on the particular market en-
vironment, different PFs can be plausible.
In this paper, we assume that the “planner” considers as eco-
nomic PF the long-run social welfare function shown in the
following:
(1)
The performance function corresponds to the difference
between the overall value of social welfare over the whole tem-
poral horizon in which the transmission expansion is supposed
to be in place and the estimated transmission expansion costs.1,2
A long-run social welfare function, similar to the one we use
as PF, has been traditionally adopted in the vertically integrated
environment, when the Peak Load Pricing problem has been
studied with reference to generation planning and price tariffs
[42], [43]. More recently, it has been used in the context of
perfect competitive market, for the definition of an appropriate
transmission access charge to allow transmission investment re-
covery [44].
It should be noted that the RTN solution strongly depends
on the set of candidate network upgrades that will be con-
sidered for PF assessment. Given the combinatorial nature of
the transmission expansion problem, it is very hard to analyze
all the possible transmission expansion alternatives, especially
for a real-size network. Therefore, the “planner,” beyond to an-
alyze the transmission expansion proposals—if any—proposed
by independent investors, should consider a set of solutions ob-
tained, for example, from classical transmission expansion pro-
grams [4]–[10]. Additionally, transmission upgrades suggested
by the system operator or by the authority in charge of moni-
toring market power abuse should be considered.
1Note that  = e , where r is the instantaneous interest rate, and ! is the
“real” time between two periods. Furthermore, [ (t   1)] refers to  to the
power of (t   1).
2Section III illustrates the simulation tool proposed for estimating the SW
for the specific market structure analyzed in this paper.
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Fig. 1. Sketch of the whole game.
Since the RTN definition is quite general, different market
structures and different “planner” concerns can be conveniently
addressed by an appropriate simulation tool, including market
rules and market participants’ strategic behaviors modeling and
by a suitable choice of PF. For example, if we suppose that
market agents, beyond to participate to energy spot market, trade
also (short- or long-term) FTRs, the modeling of those addi-
tional trades needs to be considered when social welfare esti-
mation is addressed; whereas, if we assume that the “planner”
is concerned with equity issues, regarding the share of welfare
between producers and consumers, then the PF used to deter-
mine the RTN could be the long-run consumer surplus.
III. RTN SIMULATION TOOL
The RTN is evaluated as the SPNE of a dynamic noncooper-
ative game [45], [46]. An SPNE is a refinement of NE, i.e., it is
an NE equilibrium that is more credible than others, since the
correspondent players’ strategies constitute an NE in every sub-
game of the original game [47]. In context of electricity market
equilibrium analysis, the notion of SPNE has already been used
by [48].
In Fig. 1, a sketch of the game is drawn.
The players of the game are the and all the power
producers and .
The game is organized in the following way.
1) The chooses a possible investment expansion
plan from the set of feasible transmission expansion
plans .
2) The chosen investment is observed, and a
—composed by stage games ,
—is played by the power producers only.
Each stage game is composed by several spot market
sessions.
3) The players’ payoffs, both for the power producers,
and for the , occur.
The stage games that follow a given are in general all
different, even if it is assumed that the market participants are
the same in every stage game (we do not assume any entry or
exit from the market).
When analyzing the , we do not consider a phys-
ical link between the stage games composing the multistage
game, and so, the result of a does not influence the
.
The proposed simulation tool allows computing an SPNE of
the game by simulating strategic behaviors of power producers
during every and so evaluating an NE sample for each
that follows a particular transmission investment expansion.
In the following, assumptions and mathematical models for
spot market sessions, for stage games and for multistage games,
are described.
A. Spot Market Session
1) Spot Market Assumptions: The model of a single spot
market session considered in this paper is based on a pure
pool model. The spot market is cleared by an ISO. The nodal
price scheme, also called Locational Marginal Price scheme,
is adopted and no ex ante transmission charges, or active trade
of transmission rights, are considered. The spot market is
organized as an auction in which both power producers and
consumers are allowed to participate. Moreover, suppliers
and customers are supposed to bid, respectively, affine nonde-
creasing curves and affine nonincreasing curves.
We assume that the generator marginal cost function and the
load demand function are as in the following:
(2)
(3)
where is the price, and , , , and are all positive
coefficients.
2) Market Clearing Mechanism: The market clearing mech-
anism is based on the maximization of the hourly declared social
welfare subject to constraints. It can be formulated as a convex








where (4) represents the social welfare function and depends on
the bid submitted by market participants. Equation (5) enforces
the power balance at each node (dc load flow formulation), since
and are the vectors of nodal injections and nodal with-
drawals, respectively. Equation (6) imposes restrictions over the
line flows to comply with line limits. The line flows are
calculated on the basis of line reactances. Finally, (7) and (8)
specify the market participant’s maximum production and max-
imum demand, respectively.
Note that the matrices and are, in fact, function
of the network topology , i.e., and
3The notation “diag(w)” is used to indicate a diagonal matrix whose entries
are the components of the vector w, and the apex “ ” means transpose.
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. Also note that all the variables (primal and
dual variables) are functions of the under analysis.
The maximum transmission capacities of the lines
depend on transmission network topology. In particular,
, where is the ex-
isting transmission capacity, and is the new transmission
capacity added to the system because of the transmission
investment plan considered to be in place.
By collecting the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality
conditions for the primal problem (4)–(8), and using the appro-
priate dual variables, we can write the following linear comple-











Note that the notation means that the two vectors
are perpendicular. Moreover, the two formulations (4)–(8) and
(9)–(16) are equivalent.
3) Spot Market Session Results: When the spot market
session under analysis is solved, the market prices and
dispatched quantities and withdrawn quantities
are obtained.
Therefore, for a single session , of the
stage game, the generator’s payoff is
(17)
the benefit of each load is
(18)
and the “true” social welfare, computed taking into account the
demand bid functions, and the producer cost functions, is
(19)
The total producers’ payoff is equal to
, and the total consumers’ payoff
is .
B. Stage Game: Strategic Behavior and Market Equilibrium
The aim of this section is to illustrate the stage game model
and its equilibrium. In particular, first, a detailed discussion con-
cerning the reasons of assuming the producers’ strategic vari-
able to be the slope of the supply function and then concerning
the reasons of choosing to group a certain number of spot market
sessions in a unique stage game are provided. Finally, the pro-
cedure adopted for evaluating a sample of NE of is
presented.
1) Assumptions and Producer’s Strategic Variable: A
number of short-term models—proper of industrial economics
literature and based on game-theory concepts—have been
adopted for simulating strategic behaviors of market partici-
pants and electricity market equilibria (see [28] for a review).
All those game theory models rely on the concept of Nash
equilibrium, i.e., they aim to determine an equilibrium condi-
tion in which none of the power producers has the incentive to
unilaterally change its strategy.
The difference among those models depends on the strategic
variable the agents are supposed to manipulate and on the beliefs
regarding rivals’ reactions.
In this paper, an SFE model, introduced by [50], is adopted
to represent the strategic behavior of power producers. The SFE
model is considered one of the most appropriate to be used when
dealing with electricity market auctions, since it allows rep-
resenting more realistically the bidding procedure through the
strategic variation of supply bid [32].
However, when an SFE model is chosen, there exist different
ways the bid function could be manipulated, and depending
on the supply function parametrization adopted, different re-
sults can arise. The most frequently used models for supply bid
parametrization are [32] as follows:
• manipulation of the sole intercept of the bid supply
curve (with the prices axis) [39], [51];
• manipulation of the sole slope of the supply bid curve
[51];
• manipulation of intercept and slope both arbitrarily
chosen [52];
• manipulation of intercept and slope when a linear rela-
tionship is supposed to exist between the two parameters
[30], [53].
Baldick demonstrates that, for a single-pricing period, the
parametrization of the supply function is so critical for the
equilibrium results that some of the results shown in the litera-
ture are “artifacts of assumptions about the choice of particular
bid parameters,” and that the manipulation of both intercept
and slope both chosen arbitrarily should be adopted when the
NE is studied [52]. Furthermore, he suggests that, in a multiple
pricing-period model, revealing the intercept honestly could be
optimal. In [32], indeed, Baldick et al. demonstrate that, in a
market setting in which supply bid functions are supposed to
be held constant over a certain time horizon, and for a certain
load duration characteristic, having the strategic intercept equal
to the true intercept is incentive compatible. The economic in-
terpretation of this type of behavior is that at low output levels,
the bidders have less motive to exaggerate their costs.
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The model adopted in this paper, for representing the strategic
interactions among the power producers in the stage game, ex-
tends the multifirm bid model proposed by Hobbs et al. [39] to
a slightly different framework in which, for market power mit-
igation purposes, the suppliers are requested to bid consistently
over an extended time horizon, as suggested by [52].
The multifirm model from [39] “coordinates the results of in-
dividual firm’s models in an attempt to find an equilibrium for
all generators’ bids.” In particular, the individual firm problem is
formulated as a bilevel model and is solved by adopting a mathe-
matical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) approach
or, more specifically, a mathematical program with linear com-
plementarity constraints.
Differently from [39] where the producer’s strategic variable
is the supply function intercept, in this paper, the suppliers are
supposed to manipulate their bids by varying only the slope of
their true marginal cost curve. Basically, instead of offering their
true slope , they offer a strategic slope . Note
that, when the producer’s strategic variable is the slope of the
supply function, the equilibrium conditions become nonlinear,
whereas this is not the case when the producer’s strategic vari-
able is the intercept, as assumed in Hobbs et al.’s model.
Furthermore, since in the considered regulatory framework
the producers are obliged to offer the same bid for all the ses-
sions that compose a period , the power producer strategic
variable is the same for all the market session of a given stage
game, i.e., .4 It is worth remarking
that, from the power producers’ point of view, the are
coupled by the same strategic variables . There-
fore, when each power producer is seeking its best response for
the , he needs to take into account that his choice af-
fects all its own spot market payoffs . Hence, when the
NE profile
for the stage game is computed, the spot market
equilibrium results for can be determined.
Finally, let us also remark that the study here concerns pure
supply strategies only. In general, Nash SFE for pure strategies
of the players does not necessarily exist, nor is it necessarily
unique [1], [50]. As in [39] and [51], we study a case where we
are able to find an equilibrium.
2) Power Producer Problem: For every period , each pro-
ducer faces the need of maximizing its profit, taking into ac-
count what the ISO does (i.e., the market clearing rules) as well
as what its rivals do (i.e., how its rivals bid). The problem of the
single constitute a bilevel model and may be modeled as a






4Note that sometimes, for sake of compactness, we use the notation  for
 (TE ).
where the function to be maximized in (20) corresponds to the
total profit of producer obtained as the sum of the
profits accruing to him from the various that
compose the under analysis. Equation (21) enforces the
strategic variable to be at least equal to the true slope of the
marginal supply bid. Finally, the impact of ISO actions and the
rivals’ actions, in any market session composing the , are
taken into account through the constraints in (22).
3) NE Calculation: An equilibrium, in pure strategies, for
the will exist when no producer will have the incentive to
change its bid unilaterally. Therefore, we need to find a strategy
profile such that is the best response of
player to the best response of any of the other market par-
ticipants [45].
The diagonalization algorithm has been used to compute the
NE. This is an iterative algorithm for the NE calculation, used
also in the power market context (see, e.g., [30], [39], and [54]).
The solution of the diagonalization algorithm
corresponds to the sample
of NE of the .
4) Market Equilibrium Results: Given the calculated
NE strategy profile of the stage game , the market
equilibrium results of each composing the stage
game can be calculated.
The producer payoff for the period is calculated as the sum
of the payoffs obtained in each of the spot market sessions
that compose the , as shown in the
following:
(23)
Analogously, the consumer payoff for the stage game is
(24)
Finally, the true social welfare for the stage game is as follows:
(25)
C. Game Solution
In order to evaluate a sample of SPNE of the game, the gen-
eralized backward induction procedure can be adopted [46].
The process for the SPNE’s sample computation works as
follows. An NE for any stage game , i.e., a strategy
profile, is calculated as illustrated in Section III-B
The corresponding static payoff of the player is
[see (23)].
Then, from the knowledge of these NEs, a sample of SPNE
of the is determined as follows:
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In particular, the sample of NE for the is evalu-
ated as the sequence of samples of NE for .
In fact, since it is assumed that there is no physical link between
the periods for any given history of the game
(i.e., for any given set of choices of the players in every stage
game that precedes the one under analysis), each power pro-
ducer chooses as optimal strategy for the the one that op-
timizes its static payoff [55].
It should be noticed that if for any stage game where there
exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, then there exists
a unique SPNE for the . This is not necessarily
the case in our framework; however, we limit ourselves to the
computation of a sample of SPNE of the game.
For the generic , the payoff of , corre-
sponding to the strategy profile , is given by5
(26)
The payoff of the for the subgame is
equal to
(27)
Finally, the reduced form of the game—obtained by substi-
tuting each with the corresponding NE strategy
profile—is derived.
Given the generic , the “planner” payoff for the whole
game is equal to the payoff of the multistage game following
, i.e., , net of investment costs
(28)
Hence, the optimal investment plan for the “planner” is
the one that maximizes expression (28), that is
(29)
The sample of SPNE of the whole game we calculated is
, and the RTN corresponds to the chosen
transmission investment plan .
Note that the “planner” subgame perfect outcome is the value
of the PF, defined in (1), calculated for the .
Whenever, the SPNE of this game can be proved to be unique,
the RTN is indeed an optimal network from an economic point
of view. Otherwise, the found RTN is optimal in a weaker sense.
IV. TEST RESULTS
A numerical example is presented below to illustrate the
method proposed in this paper.
5To be more precise, when the producer payoff is evaluated for a MSG ,
also the fixed costs borne by the producer during that period should be included.
However, for purpose of simplicity, these costs are not taken into account here.
Fig. 2. Test network.
TABLE I
PARAMETERS OF MARGINAL COST FUNCTION AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS
The model has been implemented in GAMS. In particular, the
NLPEC problem has been solved using CONOPT3, which is a
nonlinear programming solver.
For purpose of clarity, all the stage games are supposed to be
equal in our example, that is, the ’s have the same inputs:
market participants, production cost, and demand functions for
all . Moreover, the only effect of line investment is supposed to
be the increase of the maximum line capacity.
We consider that any stage game is composed by 730 market
sessions (about one month). We suppose that 487 h are
off-peak hours with the same characteristics (we indicate those
hours with apex ), and the remaining 243 h are peak hours
with the same characteristics (we indicate those hours for
sessions). The whole time horizon (ten years) is composed by
120 stage games.6 Furthermore, the discount factor is assumed
to be equal to 0.98.
The system under study is represented in Fig. 2. It is com-
posed of three buses , 2, 3, two generators , ,
two loads , , and three lines that interconnect these three
buses.
The cost and the utility function parameters considered in the
example are shown in Table I.
The transmission capacity of the network has been assumed
as in the following. For the line connecting buses and
, MW, whereas for the remaining two lines,
MW.
6The example of this paper is for illustrative purposes only. When the analysis
is performed for a real-size network, it should be appropriate to consider a higher
number of market sessions and stage games. The appropriate number of stage
games to be analyzed depends on the number of sessions  composing each
SG and so on a regulatory constraint. If we suppose that every stage game is
composed by a single market spot session, and so no regulatory constraint for
mitigating market power is adopted, a discretization of the annual load duration
curve in 6–10 blocks could be sufficient; whereas, if we suppose that each SG
is composed by 24 market sessions, then we could think about considering a
representative working day and a representative weekend day, for each month,
and use appropriate weight for taking into account the real number of days.
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The studied investment plans alternatives
, in this illustrative example, are
chosen by considering possible combinations of investment in
the two lines having a maximum transmission capacity of 100
MW. A significant number of investment alternatives
belonging to the set
are considered, and some of those are shown in the follow-
ing: {(0,0,0),(0,0,100),(0,0,150),(0,0,200),(0,50,0),(0,50,150),
(0,100,100),(0,150,100),(0,200,150), }. An appropriate in-
vestment cost for any transmission expansion
alternative, has been considered.7
Results obtained for three particular investment plan alterna-
tives, chosen among more than 50 different ’s studied, are
presented in the following. In particular, the results of a stage
game for the existing network are shown, together with
those of and cases. Investment plans and
are the transmission alternatives that maximize the performance
function calculated for perfect competitive behavior
and for strategic behavior, respectively, of market participants.
A. Existing Network: Case
The case corresponds to have “no investment in any
line,” i.e., .
The following NE strategy profile for the stage game
is obtained: MW and
MW .
The market results, of the stage , for a single off-
peak hour session and a single peak hour session
, obtained in case of Perfect Competition (PC), i.e.,
when each generator offers its marginal costs, and in case of
Strategic Behavior (SB), i.e., when they offer their ,
are shown in Table II.
It is useful to observe that for the session, the market
results for the PC and SB cases are completely different, both
for the produced quantities and for the prices; whereas, for the
session, it is interesting to notice that, even if the pro-
duced/withdrawal quantities do not change, the prices at the pro-
duction buses in the SB case differ significantly from the prices
obtained in the PC case. Basically, this type of behavior attests
that the power producers are able to extract all the transmission
rent, which in case of PC was taken by the ISO.8
The social welfare, the producer surplus, and the consumer
surplus, of the stage game , for the 730 market ses-
sions, computed according to (23)–(25), respectively, measured
in millions of dollars, are shown in Table III.
By comparing the social welfare values obtained as the re-
sults of the PC case and the SB case, it can be noted that the
social welfare decreases only in the first period. In the second
period, indeed, the share of social welfare corresponding to the
transmission rent is taken by the power producers, but the whole
amount of social welfare does not change. On the contrary, the
7In this paper, the IC(TE ) is obtained as the sum of the line investment
costs. The assumed line investment cost is a linear function of megawatts in-
stalled, where the unit cost is equal to $180 000/MW. Moreover, the set of trans-
mission investment alternatives T E , considered in this paper, includes only line
investments F that are integer multiple of 50 MW.
8Similar findings have been highlighted also by [2], [51], and [56]. Note that
in [2] and [56], the generators were assumed to compete according to a Cournot
model, whereas in [51], various strategic bidding models are considered.
TABLE II
MARKET RESULTS OF THE MK SESSIONS COMPOSING
SG (TE ): PC AND SB CASES
TABLE III
SOCIAL WELFARE, PRODUCER SURPLUS, AND CONSUMER SURPLUS (10 $)
OF THE MK SESSIONS COMPOSING SG (TE )
TABLE IV
MARKET RESULTS OF THE MK SESSIONS COMPOSING
SG (TE ): PC AND SB CASES
TABLE V
SOCIAL WELFARE, PRODUCER SURPLUS, AND CONSUMER SURPLUS (10 $)
OF THE MK SESSIONS COMPOSING SG (TE )
values of producer surplus in the SB case are higher than those
in the PC case for both market sessions.
B. Transmission Expansion: Case
The transmission investment plan corresponds to
. The total cost of such a transmission
investment alternative is equal to $63 million.
The values of the strategic variables that constitute an
NE of the stage game are
MW and MW .
Note that these values are in between the values
that would have been obtained if different bids could be sub-
mitted in any market session. In fact, the optimal strategy
profiles in such cases are MW
and MW for the off-peak market
session and MW and
MW for the peak market session
.
The market results, of the stage game , organized
as in the previous example, are reported in Tables IV and V.
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TABLE VI
MARKET RESULTS OF THE MK SESSIONS COMPOSING SG (TE ):
PC AND SB CASES
TABLE VII
SOCIAL WELFARE, PRODUCER SURPLUS, AND CONSUMER SURPLUS (10 $) OF
THE MK SESSIONS COMPOSING SG (TE )
For the investment alternative, in the PC case, conges-
tion arises only during the peak hour, when the flow in the line
between buses and reaches 300 MW; whereas,
in the SB case, both in the peak and in the off-peak hour, the
line flows are lower than the maximum line transmission ca-
pacity. Therefore, there is a unique price for each session of the
market (i.e., the three nodal prices for a given market session are
the same). Moreover, the nodal prices in the SB case are higher
than the corresponding nodal prices in the PC case, because of
the strategic behavior of the suppliers.
By comparing the results from Table II with those from
Table IV, the general increase of dispatched quantities in any of
the corresponding cases, together with a remarkable decrease of
the nodal prices in almost all the cases can be noted. Therefore,
an increase of the social welfare with respect to the case
is observed, as shown in Table V.
By comparing the market results gathered in Table III and
Table V, for the transmission expansion plans and , it
can be noted that, while for the PC case, significant differences
of the results ( , , and ) can be observed only with
regard to the peak load market session , for the SB case,
also the off-peak values of social welfare and surplus increase.
C. Transmission Expansion: Case
The transmission investment plan corresponds to (0,
150, 100). The total cost of such investment alternative is $45
millions.
The values of the strategic variables that constitute the cal-
culated NE of the stage game are
MW and MW .
The market results are reported in Tables VI and VII. It is
useful to note that, due to the limited transmission capacity of
the lines, a reduction of dispatched quantities with respect to the
case occurs in the peak hour of the PC case; whereas, in the
SB case, the limited transmission capacity allows the power pro-
ducers to exercise even more of their market power. The values
in Table VII show that, both in the PC and in SB case, the values
of and are in between those obtained for the
TABLE VIII
POWER PRODUCERS’ PAYOFFS (10 $)
FOR THE STAGE GAMES SG (TE )
TABLE IX
PLANNER PAYOFFS (10 $) OF THE ANALYZED TE ’S
and ; whereas, the in the SB case of is higher
than the producers’ surplus obtained for the other two transmis-
sion investment alternatives and .
D. Payoffs of the Players
In Table VIII, the payoffs that each of the power producers
gains at NE, for the previously considered cases, are gathered.
In the PC cases, the profits increase together with the increased
transmission capacity available; whereas, for the SB cases, cer-
tainly the power producers benefit from the increase of trans-
mission capacity, even though their profits decrease when the
transmission expansion is too large.
Table IX shows the value of planner payoffs, i.e., the PF value,
obtained when the power producers act according to the calcu-
lated NE, in the three cases under study. Moreover, in order to
better analyze the results, the and the total social wel-
fare values, over the considered time horizon, are also reported.
If the power producers are supposed to offer their true mar-
ginal costs, the optimal choice is the transmission expansion
plan , since the is the highest among the
planner payoffs values calculated in the PC cases.
Meanwhile, if the strategic behavior of power producers is
taken into account, the best value of the is obtained
for the transmission investment alternative.
Finally, it should be noted that is the sub-
game perfect Nash outcome of the game and that agrees
with the definition of RTN given in Section II.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The aim of this paper is to provide the social planner with a
reference transmission network that can be used as a benchmark
when he evaluates investment proposals. In fact, the RTN repre-
sents the network upgrade that maximizes a given performance
258 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS, VOL. 21, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2006
function, over a certain time horizon, when oligopolistic behav-
iors that are likely to arise in a deregulated environment have
been taken into account.
In this paper, a general approach based on game-theory con-
cepts for the estimation of the RTN has been proposed. The
strategic interactions among power producers that interact in a
multisession framework have been modeled using an SFE ap-
proach.
Furthermore, the impact of producers’ behaviors on nodal
prices, dispatched quantities, and social welfare value, for var-
ious transmission expansion alternatives, has been shown and
compared with analogous results obtained by assuming a per-
fect competitive framework.
The proposed method has been applied to the study of a
sample system. The simulations show how, in the studied
oligopolistic framework, the optimal network has transmission
line capacities smaller than the optimal transmission line ca-
pacities obtained for a perfect competitive setting. However,
it would not be surprising to find examples in which RTN
transmission line capacities, greater than optimal transmission
capacities estimated for a perfect competitive framework, may
increase the performance function value and enhance market
efficiency.
Future research can take different directions. One of the main
challenges would be to frame the RTN concept in a regula-
tory policy for transmission expansion. In particular, an appro-
priate centralized transmission investment framework could be
investigated. In such a case, the RTN could constitute the trans-
mission expansion that the central planner would implement.
Another research direction may be to investigate a regulatory
framework in which the RTN is only evaluated by the central
planner and then provided as a benchmark in a public call for
transmission network upgrades. The investors interested in par-
ticipating in transmission upgrade may apply to the call and may
submit proposals for transmission expansions they would like to
realize. In such a case, the planner could accept combinations
of expansions whose PF value does not differ significantly from
the PF value of the RTN.
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